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and the COVID-19 
pandemic 
1. In the March 21st edition of the magazine The Spectator, the 
British journalist Matt Ridley, who blogs on science, the 
environment, and the economy, wrote: “Never once in my six 
decades did I expect to be back in a 17th-century world of 
social and physical distancing as a matter of life and death. 
(…) Many people will die prematurely. Many will lose their 
jobs. Many businesses will go under. (…) The only question is 
how many in each case. We are about to find out how robust 
civilization is. The hardships ahead are like nothing we’ve 
known.”1  
2. The ongoing medical crisis is particularly challenging for 
two reasons: first, it develops while we do not know the rules of 
the game to organize neither a proper defence (vaccine) against 
it nor a proper social protection through an impossible general 
distancing, and second it shakes the very foundational factors 
of our strong long-term socio-economic growth, indeed of our 
civilization. As for the developing economic crisis, which the 
medical crisis and our best response to it are generating, it has 
two prongs: first, the lost jobs and failing firms and supplier-
business-customer networks and second the attacks against our 
                                                 
1 M. Ridley, We are about to find out how robust civilisation is, The Spectator, 
March 21, 2020. 
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economic institutions and organizations by sorcerers’ 
apprentices and fake intellectuals. The latent discourse against 
markets, competition, economic freedom, and globalization, 
will likely amplify in the coming months.  
3. The ability to trade, especially with strangers, is a 
distinguishing characteristic of humans. This ability is unique 
to us and far exceeds the simple reciprocity observed in other 
animals, where it is typically limited to individuals of the same 
clan or family—frequently involving goods of the same 
undiversified kind received or consumed within a relatively 
short period of time.  
The emergence of economics 
4. The emergence of economics as a positive science, which 
studies the evolving incremental accumulation of trade, 
coordination, and incentivization mechanisms that has allowed 
a truly collective intelligence to flourish within mankind, has 
led to a normative science of ways and means, tools and 
instructions to foster the further development, improvement, 
and resilience of our collective intelligence.  
5. The development of civilization follows a fundamental 
guiding principle: the ongoing quest—in a sometimes orderly 
and stepwise and sometimes random and haphazard 
progression—for mechanisms of exchange, trade and 
specialization, coordination, communication, and 
incentivization that are increasingly efficient and effective.  
6. This quest relies on factors such as urban density, open and 
integrated transportation systems, specialization of tasks, 
reduced environmental footprint, and social institutions that 
generate mutual trust between strangers. Each one of us, 
focused on our specialized task, is literally depending on a vast 
number of strangers: simply counting the people who worked 
for my well-being this hour would take many days.  
The collective intelligence 
7. The collective intelligence that coordinates the work of 
billions of cells (all of us) within modern society seen as a 
social body, through competitive markets, market-like 
institutions, and competitive international trade, needs to, and 
does continuously, bolster this body’s resilience to the 
inevitable shocks and spells of chaos and dysfunction: 
pandemics, wars and military escapades, and economic crises. 
As a result, our world has become more cooperative, safer, 
more resilient, and more innovative. The marginal deviant 
behaviour reported in the news and to be eradicated remains 
mostly insignificant.  
8. To paraphrase Matt Ridley, let’s just say that sometimes we 
have no choice but to play Russian roulette, remaining 
optimistic while venturing into the unknown. It takes time for 
Mother Nature to get the live round into the proper chamber, 
combining high contagion with asymptomatic carriers and a 
significant mortality rate, but sometimes she pulls it off, leaving 
us with the major pandemics and catastrophes of the past and 
today’s COVID-19—black swan events.  
9. So far, we have made it through every one of them, though 
sometimes with considerable losses and scars that persist for 
decades.  
10. There are those who complain that we should have seen it 
coming and been better prepared on the basis of the 
precautionary principle. However, when confronted with many 
risks, especially those that are unknown (the unknown 
unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know)2 or poorly 
understood and of very low probability, a surfeit of caution may 
result in needless and costly paralysis and stagnation. However, 
once the triggering event has been observed, it would be a 
serious error to allow the effects to unfold exponentially. That 
is where we are at with COVID-19. 
The financial crisis and recession of 2007-2010  
11. The financial crisis and recession of 2007–2010 was caused 
by the gaming of poorly designed incentive mechanisms and a 
collapse of interbank confidence because of free-riding and 
financial fraud. The solution was a massive injection of 
financial liquidity to prevent a total collapse and targeted 
investments of public funds in major financial and 
manufacturing institutions. This government largesse was 
offered on draconian and costly terms. Banks were charged 
high interest rates to motivate them to quickly restore their 
balance sheets by raising new equity. And failing private firms 
were acquired, once bankrupt, by the government and later 
resold.3 This was strong medicine.4  
The current situation is very different 
12. The current situation is very different! At its core, the 
COVID-19 crisis does not find its roots in distorted incentives 
or a generalized loss of confidence, but rather in a lack of 
medical knowledge compounded by social proximity, which, 
having previously improved our public health and resilience, 
                                                 
2 D. Rumsfeld (2002), the former US Secretary of Defense: “[T]here are known 
knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one 
looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter 
category that tend [sic] to be the difficult ones” 
(https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636) 
3 See M. Boyer (2015), Growing out of the Crisis and Recessions: Regulating 
Systemic Financial Institutions and Redefining Government Responsibilities, 
CIRANO Scientific Series 2015s-01, 54 pages, 
https://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2015s-01.pdf, and 
http://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2017MO-04.pdf (Tome 2, chap. 24); See also 
P. Veronesi and L. Zingales (2010), Paulson’s gift, Journal of Financial 
Economics 97, 339–368 (note: the article predates most reimbursements by the 
banks). For disbursement by and reimbursement to US Treasury over time for all 
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) funds, see the TARP tracker at 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-
Tracker.aspx#All. 
4 In spite of the government heavy-handed interventions, the market discipline 
eventually prevailed and, contrary to entrenched popular beliefs, responsibilities 
and liabilities were broadly imposed and implemented.  
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has now mutated into an engine of dissemination of the virus. 
We are living through a pandemic and a global economic stress 
that will be remembered for generations. 
13. The actions taken by most governments thus seem 
appropriate, at least as of March 31: temporarily reduce social 
proximity to curb the spread of the virus, accept that this will 
induce an expected significant but temporary economic 
recession, cushion the harm to individuals and businesses 
resulting from this recession by public support programmes, 
invest massive resources as of immediately in the search for a 
vaccine, and accept an explosion of public debt way above the 
limits governments were trying to abide by. 
14. These public policies come with significant costs and risks. 
Reducing social proximity risks to translate into national 
proximity rules against international trade and institutions, a 
major factor of economic development and growth, and 
civilization. Accepting that these policies will trigger a deep 
recession if not an outright depression is playing with the fire of 
inequalities as recessions are tilted against the poor, individuals 
and countries. Cushioning the harm to individuals and 
businesses through generous public programmes risks 
developing a sense of irresponsible dependence and reliance on 
pyromaniac firefighting governments. Investing massive 
resources in pharmaceutical research on COVID-19 may grasp 
resources from other important research, pharmaceutical or 
otherwise. Finally, accepting an explosion of public debt will 
require strong discipline to pay it back through either savings, 
taxation, and inflation or reduced lower-quality public services.  
15. The ratchet effect of Leviathanesque governments and 
public sector bureaucracy is the direst possible consequence of 
the above policies. While hoping that the measures are 
adequate, we must not neglect to prepare for the economic 
recovery when the time is right. The first and foremost 
challenge will be to avoid throwing out the baby 
with the bathwater as fear may remain present. We must be 
careful not to damage the engines of growth and civilization 
that has generated enormous benefits to mankind over the last 
decades or centuries: the quest for efficiency and effectiveness 
through exchange, trade and specialization; and the capacity 
and willingness to identify and adopt inventions and 
innovations, whether technological, social or organizational. 
Such capacity and willingness are rooted in individual attitudes 
towards change, which itself depends on incentive mechanisms 
and financial and insurance instruments, which individuals, 
organizations, and firms can rely on to manage change and 
global risks as well as fears.  
16. Shrinking reliance on competitive markets and competitive-
like institutions and a general tendency to turn in upon 
ourselves and return to outmoded concepts of buying local or 
national represent the direst risks of current public policies. 
Insofar as the USA behaves in an irresponsible “Me First” way 
at the international level by forcing private firms to terminate 
contracts with foreign firms and governments under the 
Defense Production Act (1950),5 other national governments 
are likely to follow in a movement toward a bad but stable 
Nash equilibrium, with disastrous effects for all.  
17. More than ever, we must secure strong international health 
and agro-food clusters. These two clusters could be the first 
sectors to experience increasing government intervention, 
interference and regulation, under the flag of health and food 
sovereignty, for the benefit of some niche stakeholders and 
countries but at the expense of mankind as a whole. Stressing 
national clusters would impact negatively the situation in 
developing countries, thereby increasing the risk of new 
pandemics in developed countries. More than ever, we as 
humans are all in the same boat, but the boat is too big for some 
to see it as such. 
18. The current fear-based policies will make further 
development of a one-world vision of globalization and 
international trade very difficult. One can expect that this 
development will be stopped and even recede. It is important to 
recall and stress that all countries can and will benefit from 
such trade, independently of their absolute competitiveness. 
This statement is arguably the most important finding in 
modern economic theory. It is the foundation of free-trade 
policies against protectionism, that is, the foundation of policies 
favouring social well-being, poverty eradication, wealth 
creation, and social and economic growth against the specific 
private interests of lobby groups, whatever the grandiloquence 
of such interest groups. 
19. Paul A. Samuelson, the 1970 Nobel laureate in economic 
sciences, once answered a challenge from mathematician 
Stanislaw Ulam to name one proposition in all of the social 
sciences which is both true and non-trivial.6 His answer: 
“Comparative advantage. That it is logically true need not be 
argued before a mathematician; that it is not trivial is attested 
by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have 
never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to 
believe it after it was explained to them.”  
The huge Increase in public debt 
20. The huge increase in public debt may send the signal that 
debt is good and apparently cheap. If governments could 
implement such a recourse to debt to fight COVID-19, why not 
use debt also to overcome climate change, to invest more in our 
health and education sectors at all levels, to meet our significant 
needs in infrastructures, etc. Remember the warning of the 
dismal science: Needs are infinite, but resources are limited. 
The ensuing drop in fiscal discipline, rather than moving us 
towards a more cooperative world, is the seed of forthcoming 
aggressive political battles and social disruption.  
                                                 
5 Such international trade restrictions could be termed “overreaching/illegal use of 
the Act.”  
6 In Understanding the WTO, World Trade Organization (2007). 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap1_e.pdf. 
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21. This brings us a dangerous fallacy, which is often repeated 
both in the private and public sector. In its simplest form, the 
fallacy is as follows: since the private sector cost of capital 
(cost of borrowing or raising equity finance) is higher than the 
public sector cost of capital (cost of borrowing), then the cost 
of a public sector business must necessarily be less than the 
cost a private sector firm would incur for producing, 
distributing and delivering the same goods and services. Yes, 
governments can borrow at lower rates than private 
organizations but an important cost of government borrowing is 
hidden from the casual observation of published rates or yields. 
22. A government can borrow at lower rates because it has the 
right and power to raise if necessary additional taxes to 
reimburse its debt holders, that is, if its activities and projects 
fail to deliver the expected returns. A private sector firm has no 
such right or power and this justifies the requirement by lenders 
of a higher interest rate. However, from the point of view of the 
citizens who are the ultimate risk bearers as customers and 
taxpayers, the right and power of the government to literally 
withdraw money from their bank accounts to cover financial 
distress situations does have a price: it is the option value today 
of the government right to require and obtain from them 
additional funds to cover what may turn out to be ex post 
socially non-profitable projects. The cost of the explosion of 
public debt is much higher than it looks, not for governments, 
not for lenders, but for citizens and taxpayers. 
23. In other words, if the citizens were to grant a private 
organization the right and power to “tax” them if it ends up in 
financial distress, then this organization would be able to raise 
capital at the same conditions as the government. Hence, the 
claim that the governmental sector can produce at lower costs 
because the government can raise money at lower interest rates 
is a subtle but clear fallacy. 
The reforms of social democratic societies 
24. The reforms of social democratic societies’ “capitalism for 
the people.”7 Pre-COVID-19, there was significant pressure 
being exerted on social democratic societies and their 
institutions to adapt to a more competitive environment in their 
political, economic, social and cultural spheres. To maintain 
their social security programme that has conditioned their 
economic performances and characterized their high quality of 
life, social democratic societies were under pressure to become 
more efficient and effective in delivering those programmes as 
well as other public and social goods and services, efficient in 
reaching the goals and objectives set and effective in doing it at 
the lowest possible cost.  
25. There is a real danger that the COVID-19 crisis will 
obscure the urgent renewal of the legal, political and social 
interfaces between the public and private sectors in making 
                                                 
7 To borrow the title from L. Zingales (2012), A Capitalism for the People, Basic 
Books. 
democratic societies strong and innovative ones, societies in 
which justice, equity and entrepreneurship are valued 
principles.  
26. The COVID-19 has in no way reduced the creeping 
inefficiency in the production, distribution and delivery of 
public and social goods and services. This inefficiency has 
many roots, but the most important ones find their sources in 
two subsets of factors. The first subset revolves around the 
omnipresent confusion between goals/objectives and 
ways/means. This confusion is the source of numerous fruitless 
debates. It is time to clarify the goals and objectives and to 
ensure that the most efficient, least costly and least risky ways 
and means are used and harnessed to reach the goals and 
objectives to be pursued. 
27. The second subset proceeds from the capture of large 
segments and portions of the production, distribution and 
delivery processes of the public and social goods and services 
by well-organized, entrenched and highly protected interest 
groups and lobbies. Those groups have, over the years, become 
capable of imposing hurdles of many kinds, which have 
impaired sustainable performance and productivity gains. 
COVID-19 may have entrenched even more their power. 
28. It is always time to reaffirm the preponderance of goals and 
objectives and give all citizens the right to displace inefficient 
providers of public and social goods and services. Many 
observers claim that our health, education, infrastructure, and 
environment systems are failing to provide citizens with the 
level of services that they could and should provide, in spite of 
increasingly important resources being invested. How could 
and did we end up with so many problems in the production 
and distribution of public and social goods and services, 
considering that we have become richer and richer almost every 
year over the last half-century and more? 
29. If social democratic societies really aim to improve or 
simply maintain their broadly defined social protection and 
security programmes (including universal access to high-
quality education, training and health services, unemployment 
benefits, environmental protection and restoration policies, 
extensive water and sanitation services, recreational and 
cultural activities, etc.), they will have to run those programmes 
and deliver the associated public and social goods and services 
they are supposed to provide in a much more efficient and 
effective way. Competition is key. 
Competition is key 
30. Competition is the key to the emergence of more efficient 
and effective ways and means by which the public and social 
goods and services will or should be provided in the future. The 
increasing economic pressures arising from both the 
globalization of markets and the internationalization of cultures 
will lead to a reduction, shrinkage or even abandonment of 
those publicly provided programmes one way or another—
perhaps not officially, but certainly in practice with lower-
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quality goods and services and/or slower delivery, increased 
uncertainty, and lower dependability. This reduced quality of 
public and social goods and services will occur not because we 
cannot afford them anymore but because these goods and 
services are produced with increasing inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness. 
31. The current political debate on the failure of the health 
system, education system, and infrastructure system to deliver 
the goods and services they are supposed to produce and 
distribute is centred on government budget allocation. Different 
groups call for more money, sometimes under the more 
acceptable pseudonym of “reinvestment,” for health, education, 
infrastructure, environment, etc. These calls will become 
louder, now that we have learned that we could increase debt 
through the ceiling. 
32. The fundamental problem is one of organizational or 
systemic efficiency and effectiveness, not one of money or 
budget per se. Social democratic societies have become well-
educated, highly skilled societies with significant 
entrepreneurial capabilities. They have also reached a high 
level of tolerance for diversity, not regarding fundamental 
principles and objectives (justice, equity, inclusion, efficiency, 
effectiveness), but regarding the different ways and means by 
which those principles and objectives may be achieved or met 
in practice in different contexts.  
33. Misunderstanding the role of competition and the reality of 
uncertainty and risk can lead to years of suboptimal and even 
wasteful allocation of resources, human, natural and 
technological. Human behaviour can be explained from two 
major fears: the fear of competition and the fear of uncertainty, 
insecurity and risk. In the current fight against COVID-19, both 
fears may reinforce each other to move us toward a big brother 
nationalist society and be powerful engines of stagnation and 
negative growth.  
34. But they can also be powerful engines of growth and 
opportunities to increase the well-being of all. Negating or 
misunderstanding the role of competition and improperly 
assessing the importance of uncertainty, insecurity and risk are 
the two most important roadblocks towards an improved social 
democratic society.  
35. To (re)build an open social democratic model and project 
after the COVID-19 crisis is behind us, three principles should 
be relied on: the rationality of individuals; the efficiency of 
incentive mechanisms; the efficiency of competitive 
mechanisms.  
36. Rational behaviour can be characterized as the pursuit of a 
coherent set of objectives and the use of appropriate means to 
reach them. Frank Hahn (1978)8 proposes the following 
definition: “Given a set of possible actions, the agent chooses 
                                                 
8 F. H. Hahn (1978), On Non-Walrasian Equilibria, Review of Economic Studies 45, 
1–16. 
rationally if there is no other action leading to preferred 
consequences to those of the action chosen.” Rationality is an 
amoral concept that sees saints, criminals, and, of course, 
ordinary citizens, as rational people: rationality can serve the 
betterment of society as well as its enslavement. When properly 
understood, rationality presents the greatest advantage of 
allowing predictions of human behaviour and, in particular, 
changes in behaviour due to altered incentives. 
37. No economist would pretend that everyone is rational in the 
above sense in all circumstances and at all times. The notion of 
rationality must be understood in a broad sense, including 
constrained and bounded rationality as well as imperfect and 
incomplete information rationality. Moreover, the oft-assumed 
selfishness of the individual incorporates interests and opinions 
of others insofar as they are part of the individual’s preferences.  
38. Behaviour is a function of preferences and incentives. It is 
difficult to change preferences, but incentives can be used to 
lead individuals towards contributing not only to their own 
well-being but also to the well-being of all. 
39. The rationality of the individuals leads quite naturally to the 
second postulate: incentives are a powerful tool that favours 
efficiency in reaching the objectives of the open social 
democratic model and project. The importance of properly 
understanding and designing incentive mechanisms can be 
illustrated by the agricultural crisis of 1959–1961 in continental 
China. Autonomous agricultural collectivization began around 
1952 and was immediately a clear success: the agricultural 
production increased in an impressive way between 1952 and 
1958. In contexts where information can be manipulated, 
production cooperatives can be extremely profitable if certain 
organizational requirements, mainly those that allow for the 
proper handling of coordination and motivation through 
adequate mechanisms, are met. It appears that the 
organizational structure of the Chinese agricultural 
cooperatives met these requirements in the first few years.  
40. The number of cooperatives had grown to more than 
735,000 in 1957 with 119 million households as members for 
an average 160 households per cooperative. Members of a 
cooperative had the option of withdrawing their labour or 
physical capital in order to join another cooperative project if 
they believed that the productivity or their share of the benefits 
was insufficient in the former cooperative.  
41. Following the success of the first cooperatives, the Chinese 
government decided in 1958–1959 to extend the 
collectivization project to the whole agricultural production. 
The government cooperatives gathered an average 5,000 
households and the right of withdrawal was abolished to 
simplify the administration of the system. Compensation was 
also changed from a distribution based on points of merit to a 
system primarily based on the members’ needs, independently 
of productivity. The mutual observation of the comrades’ effort 
provided was possible when there were 160 households in the 
cooperative but impossible with 5,000 households. Abolishing 
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the right of withdrawal made the complementary threat from 
more productive members totally void. By 1961, grain 
production plummeted more than 30% below the levels reached 
in 1958.  
42. Justin Yifu Lin (1990),9 an economist of the University of 
Beijing at that time, attributes most of the fall in production to 
the modified organization of the cooperatives. The modification 
significantly reduced the possibility of effective coordination 
and efficient incentives for effort and resulted in a famine that 
caused an estimated 30 million deaths!  
43. Such misunderstood role of asymmetric information leading 
to opportunism, free-riding and hold-up behaviour can have 
disastrous effects. Efficient contracting for the production or 
distribution of public and social goods and services must 
include incentive-compatible mechanisms that are intended to 
optimally reduce the impact of such potential sources of 
inefficiency.  
44. The third basic principle is that competition generates 
efficiency, growth, and consequently well-being. This postulate 
is quite often subject to ill-informed and biased criticism. The 
following is a typical criticism: “Competition is not the way to 
create a strong community. If you compete with your 
neighbour, there will be a winner and a loser. We do not want 
losers.” 
45. The absence of competition generates only losers, besides 
the bureaucratic central-planning illuminated leaders who claim 
to know better than the citizens themselves what is good for 
them. Proper, open and transparent competition pushes 
everyone upwards. Modern history hardly leaves any space for 
doubt regarding relevancy and truth in the statement that such 
proper competition generates a win-win society where markets 
and solidarity are reconciled for the benefit of all.  
46. Complementary competitive mechanisms, such as 
benchmarking, competitive tendering, public-private 
partnerships, and competitive answers to NIMBY could be 
particularly efficient as needed transition mechanisms in the 
public sector.  
47. Only proper, open and transparent competitive mechanisms, 
making an optimal use of new information and communication 
technologies, can guarantee the emergence of a society where 
the interests of the citizens prevail, where choices of 
production, consumption and investments, public and private, 
are made on the basis of the best information available, best 
competencies available, and best development prospects.  
Conclusion 
                                                 
9 J. Y. Lin (1990), Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959–1961, 
Journal of Political Economy 98, 1228–1252. See also J. Y. Lin and D. T. Yang 
(2000), Food Availability, Entitlements and the Chinese Famine of 1959-61, The 
Economic Journal 110, 136–158. 
48. Let us hope that the march towards more cooperation and 
competition, more innovation, and more globalization, that is, 
the march towards a more civilized one-world vision survives 
the current handling of the COVID-19 crisis. There are 
significant risks that it will not, at least for a long time.   
